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Theory
Mohamed Amine M’HAMDI
In agent-based systems, agents can be organized within groups, called communities, where mem-
bers are providing similar or complementary services. An example of such systems is agent-based
communities of web services, where web services are abstracted as rational agents and empowered
with decision making capabilities and can interact with each other. Managing reputation of each
agent and of the whole community is a key issue towards securing this type of systems, where a con-
troller agent is designed to observe and check the behavior of each member to update and maintain
the system’s reputation. Scheduling the check (i.e. maintenance) by deciding about the moments
where the check has to be done is still an open problem. Because it is highly expensive, maintenance
cannot be done every moment or based on small history of agents’ behaviors. We propose in this
thesis a scheduling algorithm that helps the controller agent improve the quality of the reputation
mechanism, which increases the trust value of users toward the community. The proposed algorithm
is based on a class of games called Bayesian Stackelberg. Our Bayesian Stackelberg game is designed
between the controller agent and community members. We simulate and compare the eﬃciency of
our algorithm with other stochastic techniques, namely uniform, normal and Poisson distributions.
This research draws the lines for future work in the subject of optimizing reputation mechanisms
through maintenance in diﬀerent time intervals.
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This chapter introduces the context, motivation, problem deﬁnition, research questions that we aim
to answer, and summary of contributions of this thesis. We conclude this chapter with an overview
of the thesis organization.
1.1 Context of Research
Trust and reputation have gained tremendous research interest in the area of multi-agent systems.
In such open systems, social aspect implies that tasks accomplishment depends on cooperation and
delegation of those tasks to other agents. Multi-agent system by deﬁnition means that agents need
intra and inter communities cooperation from other agents to achieve and pursue their designed
objectives. However, selection process means that agents need reliable and credible information
about other agents, speciﬁcally with respect to reputation.
Agents are selﬁsh and rational. Hence, they have incentives to get higher proﬁt with lower
expense and energy when accomplishing their tasks. Thus, it is possible for such agents to act
maliciously whenever they see the opportunity to do so; whenever they are invited to give feedback
about other agents for instance. This potentially decreases the reputation of a community of agents
since its feedback ﬁle is a fundamental reference to other agents. In other terms, if these agents are
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making decisions based on previous unreliable feedback, then how can we make communities more
trustworthy?
We deﬁne an agent-based community as a virtual organization of autonomous rational agents
having incentives to interact with each other, share information and expertise, and collaborate [2].
In agent-based service communities, customers interact with providers (community members) based
on reputation. Reputation values represent customers’ aggregate views and perceptions about these
agent members in terms of satisfaction. Controller agent is a special agent in the community, which
is responsible for observing and monitoring the behavior of each agent in the same community [3].
This particular agent has also the responsibility to attract agents to this community and dismiss bad
and malicious members [4], [5]. In such settings, autonomous agent providers have incentives to join
and leave these communities based on their reputation since joining good reputation communities
will lead to more proﬁt and increase in payoﬀs. Therefore, it is up to the controller agent to manage
its reputation mechanism by performing follow up of the community members, through feedback ﬁle
for instance.
1.2 Motivations
As argued in [6], trust can be computed using diﬀerent gathered parameters such as previous feed-
back from historic interaction and referral agents impressions and satisfactions. Many of the trust
frameworks diﬀer in deﬁning the trust parameters as well as the coeﬃcient of each parameter. They
also rely on updating agents’ beliefs on a regular basis based on the agents’ behaviors to keep
reputation and trust of each agent, and so the whole system updated.
These Trust frameworks rely heavily on frequent updates in order to balance agents’ beliefs
between direct and indirect trust assessments1 on one hand [7], and dynamic update of these beliefs
[6] on the other hand. As belief update is crucial in any trustful and reliable system, it should be
implemented properly and eﬃciently. In fact, as argued in [8], predictability is a major and complex
1Direct assessment means agents know each other so they can evaluate each other based on previous direct inter-
action. Indirect assessment uses information provided by third parties such as referees.
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problem in belief update. A plausible explanation is that agents are autonomous and intelligent
entities so they can learn over time the patterns used to perform the update and act maliciously
so that their trust values get increased after each belief update. The problem we are facing is
scheduling maintenance updates so that the maintenance moments are hard to be predicted. In this
context, malicious agents that propagate fake feedback have the chance to observe the scheduling
process in order to determine when to counterattack, or collude. This means, if update scheduling
is deterministic, it is very likely that agents know when to act maliciously and beneﬁt from such
vulnerability scheme. In this thesis, the term maintenance update refers to the update activity
performed by the controller agent to adjust the aggregated reputation value of each autonomous
agent in a community. This deﬁnition is diﬀerent from the meaning of the maintenance phase in the
software life cycle.
1.3 Problem Deﬁnition
It has been shown in [9] that under periodic maintenance, controller agent is able to alleviate
collusion and discourage agents to act maliciously where this controller updates its trust belief about
each agent in the community. This maintenance allows increasing the reliability of the reputation
mechanism. Nevertheless, it is likely that autonomous agents can take advantage of predictable
maintenance phases of the controller agent (i.e. predictable check moments). Thus, the problem
is how to help the controller agent choose moments in time during a certain interval in order to
perform the check by monitoring the agents’ behavior, and so the maintenance update to reduce
malicious acts as much as possible. The key problem is then making the maintenance update phases
hard to predict by the agents.
In fact, scheduling is a critical and open issue in open multi-agent systems. The controller’s main
goal and responsibility would be to perform a scheduling process following an algorithm to decide
about its maintenance updates.
Agents can decide when it is in their best interest to act maliciously, or collude, in order to
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mislead the controller and stay in the community. In other words, driven by their motivations,
malicious and bad members aim at staying in the community and generating proﬁts for services they
provide by deciding to deceive the controller agent with fake feedback. To address this problem,
two constraints need to be emphasized in designing our scheduling algorithm. The ﬁrst one is that
the controller agent is not willing to perform the monitoring and check at every single moment.
This will require many resources and cause overhead in the system and lack of eﬃciency in terms of
overall performance as each agent should be monitored all the time. The second constraint is related
to the number of feedback needed to perform the update; it is ineﬃcient to perform maintenance
and reputation adjustment based on very few feedback. Furthermore, it is not recommended for the
controller agent to perform one single maintenance check in a large time interval. This will motivate
agents to collude in that time interval and will not help the controller agent minimize the collusion
scenarios in the community.
1.4 Research Questions
In an attempt to optimize reputation mechanism in order to allow for enhanced trust between agents,
our aim is to answer the two following research questions:
• What would be a better scheduling algorithm for the controller agent to follow in an open
multi-agent system in both static and dynamic environments in order to minimize collusion
and malicious acts that damage reputation and trust mechanisms?
• As far as predictability is concerned, how can we establish this scheduling algorithm that
should perform better than stochastic randomization techniques?
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1.5 Summary of Contributions
Our ﬁrst contribution is providing game theoretic foundation for agent communities and associated
communication between the controller and community members. This foundation has a key advan-
tage; it models the complexity of selﬁsh interactions with respect to payoﬀ function, which simpliﬁes
the motivation function for malicious agents. The second contribution is providing a scheduling
strategy based on the game theoretic foundation and an associated model. Typically, our controller
agent will be performing the task of determining when to process the scheduling during diﬀerent
time intervals. We present a scheduling algorithm that applies optimization techniques to determine
the next moments in time to perform the maintenance update. This algorithm uses and extends a
technique proposed originally in [8].
We conducted many simulations that compare our combined game theoretic model with the
proposed strategy against common and stochastic scheduling schemes. We analyze the performance
of the controller agent under diﬀerent scheduling algorithms in terms of fake feedback propagation,
controller’s payoﬀ, and predictability output.
1.6 Thesis Overview
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the background as well as related
work with respect to the improvement of trust and reputation in multi-agent systems. Chapter 3
discusses our proposed game theoretic scheduling algorithm that the controller agent will use in
order to perform maintenance update. Chapter 4 presents simulation results comparing our solution
with other periodic scheduling alternatives and shows how our algorithm performs with respect to
the fake feedback rate, controller’s payoﬀ, and predictability output. Chapter 5 concludes this thesis
by outlining main research’s output and setting up the path for future work.
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
This chapter demonstrates an understanding of agents, multi-agent systems, and an understanding
of both trust and reputation in the context of distributed artiﬁcial intelligence. After that, we
present research work that has been performed in order to enhance trust frameworks and reputation
mechanisms in multi-agent systems.
2.1 Agent
As deﬁned in [10] (page 15), an agent is a computational entity (i.e. a program) that runs on
computing devices, has autonomous control over its behavior, and can act without the intervention
of humans and other systems. It has its own attributes, believes, and behaviors to allow it to act
individually and socially.
It is very important to compare and contrast an intelligent autonomous agent with an object in
object-oriented paradigm. In terms of similarities, they both encapsulate attributes and operations
on those attributes; and they both communicate via message passing. Diﬀerences emerge in three
dimensions: autonomous, ﬂexibility and control. Unlike an object where methods can be invoked
upon one another, an agent decides whether or not to perform an action requested from another
agent or initiated by itself. In general, objects do it because they are asked to; agents do it because
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they want to. Objects need to be invoked to act; agents however are known to be reactive, proactive,
and social entities having autonomous behaviors. As far as control is concerned, it is possible for
an object to create a thread of another object. It is not however possible to do that among agents
because agents are considered to have their own thread of control.
Diﬀerences among autonomous agents are not limited to design objectives; they are also con-
cerned by agents architectures and their logic abstractions. According to [11] (page 42), there are
four types of concrete architectures for intelligent agents:
• Logic-based architecture: this architecture places logical reasoning and deduction in the center
or the heart of the architectural aspect of agents. For example, a vacuum cleaner that considers
a certain space such as room as grid-like and operates based on sensing a dirt in a given grid
and performs the cleaning is an logic based implementation of such agent.
• Reactive architecture: this architecture maps situations to actions in order to determine what
to do next.
• Belief-desire-intention architecture: this agent architecture encapsulates internal states and
characteristics that represent beliefs, desires, and intentions of agents in order to decide which
actions to perform; and ﬁnally
• Layered architecture: agents of this type are meant to ease and overcome the problems of
previous architectures. This solution consists of building agents in multi-layer models in order
to deal with diﬀerent types of behaviors such as cooperation and planning.
Let us consider a simple example of an agent application, heating to be speciﬁc. Figure 1
shows an agent’s behavioral cycle that goes through three steps. The ﬁrst one is perception. In
this stage, agent receives information through its sensors. Once information is received, agent
makes perception about what the environment is like. For example, the room temperature is under
75 degrees Fahrenheit. The next stage is decision making, or what to do. The agent maps the
corresponding decision to perform under the speciﬁed conditions determined in the perception stage,
which is based on the if-then rule. In the heating case, ”turn the heater on if the temperature is
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under 75 degrees” is considered as the rule to follow. The next and ﬁnal stage is the action stage in
which this agent performs the deduced strategy to follow through actuators, such as turning on or
oﬀ the heater.
Figure 1: Simple reﬂex agent (from [1])
The basis of our agent’s action or reaction is the information received from the temperature sensor
in one area space. It assumes that information about this environment is to a great extent close
to complete. Reality of things can get complicated. For example, if we want to have optimality of
temperature across diﬀerent independent rooms equipped with independent thermostats on each of
them, we will be faced with at least three challenges. The ﬁrst one is that we need information on each
room separately. The second challenge is that this intelligent system needs to optimize the energy
consumption of electricity towards reducing costs. The third challenge is to have independencies of
decisions in case of system failure; in other words, we do not want a centralized system that if failed,
all the thermostats of the rooms will not be able to function properly. It is logical to think that one
agent implementation is not a feasible solution to the problem because of third challenges. A new
approach is needed to answer and satisfy this intelligent technological need.
In this section, we presented in short the agent’s design problem that can be summarized as
building computational entities that can independently and autonomously act in order to successfully
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carry out tasks that are being delegated. We also introduced that one agent design solution is not
always an optimal and satisfying solution. We need to consider the implementation of many agents
interacting with each other. The next section introduces the viewpoint of multi-agent systems that
shows the role played by agents.
2.2 Multi-Agent Systems
This section presents a general viewpoint of multi-agent systems and how one agent can act par-
tially on its environment. In other words, agents act autonomously based on dedicated goals and
objectives. This brings the problem of building agents to cooperate, coordinate, and negotiate to
carry out tasks successfully when agents do not have the same interest and/or goals [10] (page 109).
In short, multi-agent systems can be deﬁned as systems mainly composed of intelligent au-
tonomous agents that are massive-scale, openly distributed, capable of eﬀectively and autonomously
deploying and redeploying computational resources to solve large computational problems such as
huge data sets and complex processing requirements [11]. For example, consider a communication
network that is automated using autonomous agents. One use of the agents is to achieve automatic
and dynamic load balancing, high scalability, and self-healing networks to overcome congestion and
optimize network resources in diﬀerent dynamic circumstances such as node failures.
One very useful application of multi-agent systems is to help predict coming issues and problems
of applying certain algorithm in a particular situation. In short, multi-agent systems to a great extent
can be considered as artiﬁcial virtual societies that abstract either individuals’ or groups’ behavior
in a social context. This approach has the purpose to simulate interactions given application and
deployment of mechanisms and rules to see what problems could raise by such application to better
serve a given community with a better solution.
Multi-agent systems are not only a collection of agents to perform actions towards achieving
one designed goal. E-commerce is an example of collection of agents where interests and goals are
divergent and in many cases contradictory. It is up to each agent acting as consumer to decide
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which other agent as provider to choose to satisfy its needs. E-bay for instance is a major online
service interaction where agents request services from other agents. However, service selection is
heavily based on previous historical interaction between these agents and/or other trusted agents
principally because agents cannot certainly predict the future of such interactions.
To maintain a sound reputation mechanism among agents, it has been proposed to conceptu-
alize agents and gather them within communities. In this case, it is assumed that agents do not
receive requests unless they are part of a community. Figure 2 explains the community conceptual
architecture with special emphasis on communities of web services CWS [12]:
Figure 2: Architecture of reputation-based CWSs
The components together with their performance represented in Figure 2 are explained below:
• User agent: it is a proxy between user web service, extended UDDI, CWS and reputation
system.
• Provider agent: like user agent, provider agent is a proxy between provider web service,
extended UDDI, CWS and reputation system.
• Master agent: it is a community’s representative in the sense that it hires, ﬁres, and man-
ages incoming requests to community members or web services. Besides, this agent has the
objective to maximize the community’s proﬁt by trying to increase incoming requests. Hence,
community’s reputation improvement is very important. In this context, the controller agent
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can be the master agent.
• Extended UDDI: In this registry, we restricted the access of user and provider agents to the
list of master agents, whereas master agents have access to the UDDI registry of web services
members.
• Reputation system: Because web services in communities oﬀer similar and competing ser-
vices, they need to be evaluated. Therefore, both user and provider agents need to gather
operational data that reﬂect performance metrics.
• Controller agent: This agent is assigned in order to take under surveillance the logging ﬁle,
which consists of reputation values such as response time log and success log, and updates the
assigned reputation of communities. In addition, this controller agent’s main responsibility is
to remove the cheated or poorly performed agent that supports particular community.
One question that raises at this point is why one agent need to interact with another agent in such
context? The answer is task delegation. As we have seen in the previous section, agents diﬀer not
only in their objectives but also in their design architecture, which implies that for diﬀerent needs,
agents have to consult with other agents, which are believed to have the expertise to accomplish
their tasks. Therefore, agents need to rely on other agents to achieve their respective goals. The
problem is which agent to choose and what are the characteristics in general context that drives
these autonomous, ﬂexible, and self-controlled entities to choose particular agents from others. This
brings the question of trust and reputation.
2.3 Trust and Reputation
In this section, we deﬁne trust and reputation and their signiﬁcance in multi-agent systems concern-




Reputation can be deﬁned as the social opinion or assessment of a group towards a person, a group,
an organization, or an agent using diﬀerent evaluation criteria. It is a signiﬁcant factor in many
ﬁelds, such as education, business, and online communities. For the sake of simplicity but without
losing generality, according to Merriam Webster [13] dictionary, it is ”overall quality or character
as seen or judged by people or in general a recognition by other people of some characteristic or
ability”.
It is extensively used in online trading such as eBay by customers to get information about other
agents. Since consumers in general behave based on their perceptions of services that are determined
by factors as needs, desires, believes, and images, they need to know if it is very likely to perform
deals with these services or autonomous agents that deliver those services. This is why it is heavily
emphasized by mechanisms of social control to decide whether certain agents should stay or leave a
community.
2.3.2 Trust
Trust can be deﬁned as the trustfulness of a trustor or the extent to which the trustor is willing
to take the risk of trust being abused by the trustee. This understanding is shared by Merriam
Webster [14] dictionary that explicitly deﬁnes trust as ”assured reliance on the character, ability,
strength, or truth of someone or something”. In other words, when agents decide to invest in other
agents concerning services they cannot perform, they need to know up to which extent they can be
satisﬁed. As pointed out in [6], in the context of open multi-agent systems with no central control
and where agents are known to be autonomous, trust is essential to initiate interaction between
agents.
In general, there are two types of trust to be conceptualized [15]:
• Individual-level trust: as the name implies, this type of trust models agents beliefs about the
honesty and reciprocity of other agents’ interactions
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• System-level trust: as the name indicates, this type suggests that autonomous agents in a
certain environment are bound by protocols, rules, and mechanisms to respect. These rules
regulate that speciﬁc environment, which is generally known as community.
According to [15], using the correlation between system-level trust and user-level trust, it is
logical to deduce that agents can analyze the strategies to be used. Such analysis can help them
gather information through various means about potential agents; therefore, they can decide for
themselves which agents are trustworthy and which are untrustworthy. In parallel, these agents are
being imposed conditions that would cause them to lose utility if they do not comply and use the
systems capabilities to propagate their reputation to promote future interactions with other agents
in the community or jeopardize these interactions that can be translated as penalties. The two types
of trusts are illustrated in Figure 3.
Figure 3: A classiﬁcation of approaches to trust in multi-agent systems
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2.4 Game Theory and Optimization
In this section, we deﬁne the notions and theories we will use in our framework, namely game theory
and linear programming.
2.4.1 Game Theory
Game theory can be deﬁned as a compact model of interaction between two or more players. As
explicitly mentioned in [16] (page 337): ”By a game we mean roughly a situation of conﬂict between
two or more people, in which each contestant, player, or participant has some, but not total, control
over the outcome of the conﬂict”. Mentioning the word outcome leads us to the notion of the utility
function, which is used to deﬁne the payoﬀs of the game [10] (page 109):
Deﬁnition 2.4.1 A utility function Ui for agent i is a function Ui : Oi → R mapping to R a set of
outcomes (or states) Oi (Oi = {o1, o2, ..., on}) that i has preference over. Preference theory suggests
that an agent i prefers the outcome ox over oy if Ui(ox) > Ui(oy).
Since players can change their actions or strategies, we need to deﬁne the meaning of both pure
strategy and mixed strategy. In addition, we diﬀerentiate between the two as presented in [17]
and [16] (page 354):
Deﬁnition 2.4.2 A strategy is a complete contingent plan that deﬁnes the action an agent will
select in every distinguishable state of the world.
Deﬁnition 2.4.3 A mixed strategy for a player P1 is a vector X = (x1, x2, ..., xm) of nonnegative
real numbers satisfying the condition x1 + x2 + ... + xm = 1, with the interpretation that P1 plays
strategy si with probability xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
Players’ behaviors are generally analyzed under both one shot games and consecutive round
games. One of the important notions of game theory towards this analysis is Nash equilibrium that
gives us a good idea in many games about the steady state in those repetitive games. The following
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deﬁnes Nash equilibrium given two players i and j playing strategies s1 and s2, respectively [10]
(page 113):
Deﬁnition 2.4.4 In general, we will say that two strategies s1 and s2 are in Nash equilibrium if:
1. under the assumption that agent i plays s1, agent j can do no better than play s2; and
2. under the assumption that agent j plays s2, agent i can do no better than play s1.
In many cases, achieving better solution concepts means identifying Pareto optimal situation in
a game. Pareto eﬃciency is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 2.4.5 An outcome is Pareto eﬃcient if there is no other outcome that improves one
player’s utility without making somebody else worse oﬀ.
2.4.2 Linear Programming
Linear programming can be deﬁned as a ”mathematical technique to maximize or minimize given
function of variables that are deﬁned under constraint conditions” [16] (page 3). For example,
consider the famous diet problem in which we have to determine an adequate diet for a person to
sustain himself/herself while paying minimum cost. Under concrete perspective, let’s consider the
case where the available food in local store are meat steak, eggs, and potatoes with the following
nutritional information:
Per unit of meat steak Per unit of egg Per unit of potatoes Requirements
Unit of carbohydrates 4 2 1 10
Unit of vitamins 8 9 8 21
Unit of proteins 2 3 1 9
Unit cost 45 25 33
Table 1: Diet optimization problem
Our objective behind this modeling is simple; we need to ﬁnd out how many units we need to
buy of meat steak, eggs and potatoes that meets our minimum requirements with minimum cost.
Let x1, x2, and x3 be the number of units of meat steak, eggs, and potatoes respectively. This
implies that we need to formulate our problem in the following way:
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min 45x1 + 25x2 + 33x3
s.t. 4x1 + 2x2 + 1x3 ≥ 10
8x1 + 9x2 + 8x3 ≥ 21
2x1 + 3x2 + 1x3 ≥ 9
x1, x2, x3 ≥ 0
(1)
This gives us the solution value of 117.5 with 1.5 units of meat steak, 2 units of eggs, and no
unit of potatoes.
Duality theorem
In mathematics, there are frequently relationships between problems that are not obvious but once
understood, they reap many dividends. If we consider the relationship between integral and deriva-
tive function expressed in fundamental theorem of calculus, it can provide a uniﬁed and coherent
view of this calculus problem. As far as linear programming is concerned, the duality theorem as
mentioned in [16] (pages 125-126) satisﬁes this coherent view. We deﬁne it as follows:
Theorem 2.4.1 Duality theorem A linear programming problem stated in the following form is said
to be in max form, which can be rewritten as:
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max c1x1 + c2x2 + c3x3 + .....+ cnxn
s.t. a11x1 + a12x2 + a13x3 + .....+ a1nxn ≤ b1
a21x1 + a22x2 + a23x3 + .....+ a2nxn ≤ b2
.
am1x1 + am2x2 + am3x3 + .....+ amnxn ≤ bm
x1, x2, x3, ..., xn ≥ 0
(2)
has its dual as this min problem
min b1y1 + b2y2 + b3y3 + .....+ bmym
s.t. a11y1 + a21y2 + a31y3 + .....+ am1ym ≥ c1
a12y1 + a22y2 + a32y3 + .....+ am2ym ≥ c2
.
a1ny1 + a2ny2 + a3ny3 + .....+ amnym ≥ cn
y1, y2, y3, ..., ym ≥ 0
(3)
Hence, if we have to apply theorem 2.4.1 to the diet problem 1, we will have the following dual
problem:
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max 10y1 + 21y2 + 9y3
s.t. 4y1 + 8y2 + 2y3 ≤ 45
2y1 + 9y2 + 3y3 ≤ 25
1y1 + 8y2 + 1y3 ≤ 33
y1, y2, y3 ≥ 0
(4)
By deﬁnition, this problem has the same optimal solution to the problem mentioned in the
previous section. Our values of y1, y2, and y3 are 10.625, 0, and 1.25, respectively.
Complementary slackness
According to [16] (pages 155-156), the complementary slackness theorem relates solution points of
a linear programming problem and its dual as mentioned in the following theorem:
Theorem 2.4.2 Complementary slackness Suppose X∗ = (x∗1, ...., x
∗
n) is a feasible solution to the
problem of
Maximizing c.X subject to AX ≤ b, X ≥ 0 (problem 1)
and Y ∗ = (y∗1 , ...., y
∗
n) is a feasible solution to the dual problem of
Minimizing b.Y subject to AtY ≥ c, Y ≥ 0 (problem 2)
Then X∗ and Y ∗ are optimal solution points to their respective problems if and only if, for each i,
1 ≤ i ≤ m, either








and, for each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, either








We start this section by drawing the link between trust and reputation in the context of autonomous
agents. In [18], Hazard and Singh focused on combining trust and reputation in an architectural
model. In this work, a life cycle model of reputation and trust aims to connect them functionally
and architecturally. The authors also stressed that trust is the forward view in time with respect to
strategy; whereas reputation is looking backward in time with respect to signaling and determining
agents’ types. This viewpoint determines the coalition between trust and reputation in an open
multi-agent system where selection of agents providing services is heavily based on overall reputation
that aﬀects the trust value. Figure 4 demonstrates this coalition. This ﬁgure points out that trust
is heavily based on reputation. Therefore, if reputation parameters are not reliable, it is very likely
that agents will be mistaken in their decisions and trust agents with fake reputation. This could lead
to disappointment and dissatisfaction in terms of overall interaction and not fulﬁlling the systems
objectives.
In [7], Bentahar et al. focused on dealing with collusion in ”social network-based trust for
agent-based services” that discusses service selection based on trust values collected either directly
or indirectly. Its main challenge is to ﬁnd out how to design a mechanism so that best strategy
for customer agents will be revealing exactly what they believe about provider agents. This work
proved that when truth telling strategy is encouraged by providing incentives, the proposed trust
model outperforms competitive models namely BRS [19], TRAVOS [20], and FIRE [21] in terms of
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Figure 4: Trust and reputation life cycle from an agent’s perspective
cumulative utility gained and good selection percentage. This is mainly due to the fact that the
proposed model assesses the credibility using other services suggestions depending on how much
they know the provider services. In terms of detecting ﬁckle behavior, this proposed model performs
better than the other models since it updates agents beliefs regularly and allows customer agents to
be ﬂexible in their decision selection. This trust framework relies on feedback, which are reputation
parameters and it assumes these reputation parameters to be reliable.
Another important work in the literature that involves computation of an optimal value of
incentive to encourage truth telling is [22]. This work showed that under speciﬁc circumstances,
it is possible to compute payment mechanism in order to provide the right amount to reviewers
whenever they are asked to rate a given service provider in both cooperative and non-cooperative
settings. In this context, cooperative and non-cooperative settings refer to the degree of coordination
in terms of reporting strategies among agents. The main result of the study suggested the existence
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of the possibility of achieving one Nash Equilibrium1 if certain conditions are being met such as
the number of feedback and payment amount. Nevertheless, this work does not consider mixed
strategies as deﬁned in 2.4.3. This means agents can still collude if they adopt an eﬃcient mixed
strategy. In addition, this incentive compatible computational model proved that the relative cost
is exponentially increasing as colluding fractions increase in partial coordination scenarios.
Investigation of the emergence of trust in social networks as introduced in [24] has received a
great deal of attention. It analyzes the issue of edge creation from diﬀerent agents over the social
correlation using a combination of declarative and numerical techniques. These techniques determine
the likelihood of edge creation that conceptualizes trust. As results of this research, it has been shown
that the proposed framework, thanks to edge creation to maintain interactions, performs better in
terms of good selection of providers. This trust framework is based on edge creation, which is driven
by the reputation network parameters that are essentially based on historic feedback.
On the same basis, the authors in [9] proposed a maintenance based trust for multi-agent systems.
They investigated how a retrospect trust adjustment can help an agent (e.g. Aga) assess other agents
(denoted here by Agb) based on three dimensions: direct trust assessment, indirect trust assessment
based on trustworthy agents, and indirect trust assessment based on referee agents as shown in
Figure 5. The main contribution of this research is summarized as follows: mutual interactions
between agents and update of their trust belief based on the ﬁnal results in order to assess the
credibility of the trustee agent in the so called maintenance phase.
Although the work investigated the optimization part of the maintenance phase in order to
make it more adaptable to diﬀerent situations, the problem of determining the suitable moment to
perform the update has not been addressed. In [25], the authors suggested that user perception is
not enough to compute service reputation, but how trustworthy the provider has been satisfying the
service level agreement should be accounted for, which has been measured through a metric called
verity. Nonetheless, monitoring and updating this verity has not been investigated.
1”a solution concept of a game involving two or more players, in which each player is assumed to know the
equilibrium strategies of the other players, and no player has anything to gain by changing only its own strategy
unilaterally” [23].
21
Figure 5: Maintenance based trust mechanism
As far as real time monitoring of services is concerned, several proposals in the literature have
shown the possibility of improving the quality of these services in communities. These proposals
aimed at implementing management block toward monitoring services. In [26], multi and coopera-
tive broker2 architecture for service selection has been proposed. Each broker manages services in
its domain and shares information about these services with other brokers. The monitoring policy
proposed in [27], which separated monitoring from management activities by dedicating a speciﬁc
community to host monitors, has allowed online detection of violations (i.e. web services are not op-
erating as expected). This has also reduced the overhead of other individual communities’s managers.
A tuning of this separation strategy for QoWS (Quality of Web Service) improvement is presented
in [28] where managerial implementation has been extended to handle selection, communication,
monitoring, adaptation, and load balancing on a periodical basis or upon request. The authors
showed that QoWS attributes such as response time and availability are getting improved with this
managerial community implementation. QoS management has been analyzed in [29] where a new
architecture providing advanced management functionalities has been developed. These functional-
ities include extending the service description with QoS-centered annotation, including a validation
2a broker can be seen as third party that mediates between clients and providers
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Stays silent (cooperates) Confesses (defects)
Stays silent (cooperates) (-1, -1) (-12, 0)
Confesses (defects) (0, -12) (-3, -3)
Table 2: Example of prisoner’s dilemma game
process to test the service interface and the level of QoS that can be provided, supporting QoS
negotiation, and monitoring the provided QoS.
The previously mentioned research aimed at creating more trusty networks that rely on repu-
tation parameters either collected from other agents or more likely from history and log ﬁles that
reﬂect historical behaviors of agents. One important question is how can we provide a meaningful
and sound reputation mechanism in order to have history ﬁles display reliable and credible informa-
tion? Researchers have provided many suggestions to answer this question by modeling the problem
as a prisoner’s dilemma game. For the sake of clarity, we deﬁne prisoner’s dilemma game in the
following paragraph.
Considering two players i and j being detained together in prison. For the detectives to make
a case, they need a confession from one of them or both. They separate them and propose to each
one of them the following deal made by the attorney general: if a prisoner confess and the other
does not, this prisoner will go free and the other will be locked away for 1 year; if both prisoner’s
confesses, each serves 3 months in prison; if both prisoner’s do not confess, they each serve 1 month
in prison. Table 2 models this game.
Given that player i is the row player and j is the column player, it is obvious that a better solution
strategy proﬁle for both of them would be to cooperate, or to stay silent. However, pure strategy
Nash Equilibrium tells us that the steady state of this game is that both players would defect.
This means that in a multi-agent system environment where service providers are permanently
competing in an open environment, agents probably would not report truthfully to each other; thus,
an aggregation of this behavior would make an open multi-agent system less trustworthy in terms
of total reputation parameters reﬂected on the feedback ﬁle. Therefore, how can we converge agents
to cooperate, given that it is improbable for both agents to communicate about their choices during
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the game?
In the context of achieving better solution concepts for prisoner’s dilemma, Banerjee and Sen
explored this possibility in their research entitled ”Reaching Pareto optimality in prisoner’s dilemma
using conditional joint action learning” [30]. They considered that independent learning and joint
action learning shows less promising results due to the fact that this type of learner assumes that
actions of diﬀerent agents are uncorrelated, which is not true in general. They present a new
action learner called CJAL that understands that its own actions aﬀect the action of other agents.
Implementing this type of learner over time will allow agents to converge to a Pareto optimal state
where both of them cooperate and act truthfully. The limitation with this type of learner is that
players converge to a Pareto optimal under speciﬁc condition related to the payoﬀ structure of the
game. That means in other cases, players may not converge to Pareto optimal and they converge
instead to a Nash Equilibrium state.
Which strategy proﬁle to adopt in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game to get higher payoﬀ? One
important experiment to mention in the context of strategy proﬁle selection is Axelrod’s prisoner’s
dilemma tour [11, 31] in which ﬁve diﬀerent strategies play again each other a repeated prisoner’s
dilemma game. These ﬁve strategies are:
• Random strategy: randomly cooperating or defecting with equal probability distribution;
• All-D: this strategy involves defecting all the time in all rounds;
• Tit-for-Tat: cooperating in the ﬁrst round and subsequently doing what the opponent did in
the previous round;
• Tester: testing on the ﬁrst round the opponent by defecting, if the opponent ever retaliates
with defecting, then subsequently playing Tit-for-Tat. Otherwise, playing a repeated sequence
of cooperating for two rounds, and then defecting; and
• Joss: Like tester, this strategy is intended to exploit ”weak” opponents. It is essentially
Tit-for-Tat, but 10% of the time the strategy suggests defecting instead of cooperating.
The setup of this experiment gave the opportunity to each strategy to play against other strategies
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for a number of consecutive rounds. The ﬁnal results showed that Tit-for-Tat is the overall winner
since it had the opportunity to play against other programs and strategies that were also inclined to
cooperate. This draws the conclusion on the overall rules to take into consideration when designing a
strategy proﬁle to succeed in prisoner’s dilemma. They can be summarized in four quality attributes
[11, 32]:
• Forgiveness: do not be envious, which means not necessary to beat your opponent in order for
you to do well;
• Niceness: do not be the ﬁrst to defect;
• Reciprocate cooperation and defection; and
• Clarity: make the actions the agents should play under a given strategy clear.
Control and investigation turned out to be necessary to promote the quality of reputation param-
eters, which are quality and market share. Game theoretic analysis in [3] aimed at investigating the
likelihood of circumstances that pushes agents to act truthfully in order to provide accurate reputa-
tion assessment and avoid providing fake feedback. Contributions of this work also lied speciﬁcally
in what incentives to be provided to act truthfully while these agents are aware of penalties assigned
by a special agent called controller agent, Cg. It has been shown that when Cg’s accuracy level
increases, agent’s tendency to fake decreases over time. This conclusion was aligned with the con-
ditions that lead agent to act truthfully using game theoretic structure [33]. Considering a network
of providers and consumers that are able to maximize their proﬁts, this research showed situations
under which rational agents can act on a best response basis as well as a game theoretic analysis
that computed the controller’s detection threshold such that trust mechanism would be collusion-
resistant. In the same work [33], the authors determined the percentage of the ﬁxed size window
that the controller agent needs to analyze in order to minimize fake feedback. It has been experi-
mentally shown that under window percentage of 40% or 60%, collusion are minimized across the
runs. However, elaboration on periodic maintenance and its impact on the quality of the reputation
mechanism are missing in this work.
25
This work has proved that trust framework can be achieved if previous recommendations are
followed. There is one problem with this strategy, especially the maintenance phase, which is related
to learning. If agents have the chance to learn ahead of time the strategy proﬁle of the controller
agent, maintenance schedule for instance, these malicious agents will be ready far ahead of time to
know when to act maliciously in a community of agents. This situation is even risky if for instance
this controller agent is following predictable time moments. This is similar to the work reported
in [8], which proposed a better solution concept to patrolling and monitoring activities that may be
vulnerable to attacks, especially if adversaries are aware of such patrolling pattern. This solution lies
in deploying ARMOR software assistant that casts this patrolling problem as Bayesian Stackelberg
game to allow the software agent appropriately weight the diﬀerent action in randomization as well





As stated in Chapter 1, our controller agent faces the challenge of scheduling the periodic main-
tenance update. This maintenance aims at updating the reputation value of each agent in the
community that constitutes the controller’s belief set. To motivate the problem before we present
our solution idea, we recall the two main assumptions we base our framework on: rational behavior of
community members and autonomous learning of these members. However, there are two constraints
that need to be considered. The ﬁrst one is that the controller agent considers expensive in terms
of resources and time to perform check at every single moment in time. The second one highlights
the ineﬃciency of performing maintenance and reputation adjustment based on very limited amount
of information. On the same basis, it is not recommended for the controller agent to perform one
single maintenance check in one large interval. It is an incentive for autonomous agents to collude
more in that large interval, which would cause an increase in fake information percentage. The main
objective of our scheduling algorithm is to reduce fake feedback in favor of truthful reporting in a
community of agents. Hence, our problem is to design a scheduling algorithm to allow the controller
agent to select moments in time from a time interval given the two aforementioned constraints. We
1the content of this chapter has been published in [34]
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also recall that our controller agent is the specialized and delegated agent to investigate the logging
ﬁle, which consists of aggregation of feedback values on each provider agent in the community.
In this chapter, we ﬁrstly present the general overview of the solution through the ﬂow chart of
the controller’s algorithm to schedule the maintenance activity. Next, we explain in details the game
theoretic framework between the controller agent and community members. In fact, the controller
agent is facing two challenges. First, this controller needs to commit to a schedule before the
community members do. Because the strategy the controller commits to can be observed by the
community members, the game we are modeling is a Stackelberg game where the controller is the
leader and community members are the followers [35,36]. Second, the controller agent is performing
maintenance of diﬀerent community members having diﬀerent types (i.e. diﬀerent probabilities of
acting maliciously). This implies that we are modeling a Bayesian Stackelberg game [35–38].
3.2 Flow Chart of the Scheduling Problem
Figure 6 depicts the scheduling problem ﬂow chart, which is composed of ﬁve main steps. The
ﬁrst step is to observe during speciﬁc moments the history of the logging ﬁle (history ﬁle) to get for
instance the number of requests made for each agent as well as the obtained quality of service (arrow
1). The second step is to construct the Bayesian Stackelberg game from remarks and investigation
of the history ﬁle (arrow 2). This step includes determining the payoﬀ matrices R and C of the two
players according to their possible strategies. The third step is formalizing the scheduling problem as
an optimization problem using the payoﬀ matrices deﬁned in the second step and applying a multiple-
integer linear programming technique called DOBSS, Decomposed Optimal Bayesian Stackelberg
Solver [8,35,39]. This technique will solve the constructed Bayesian Stackelberg game by providing
probability distributions of the actions of this controller agent (arrow 3). The fourth step is selecting
among the probability distributions of the controller’s pure strategies those that are diﬀerent than
zero, which correspond to an optimal schedule (arrow 4). Then the controller follows these moments
to perform its maintenance (arrow 5). The details of the second, third, and fourth steps are provided
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Figure 6: Flow chart diagram of the controller agent’s algorithm
in subsequent sections.
3.3 Bayesian Stackelberg Game Deﬁnition
Two players are considered in our community-based multi-agent system: the controller agent and
community members. The strategy proﬁle of the controller agent is either to perform a maintenance
check in a speciﬁc moment during a given time interval or not. The strategy proﬁle of each member
is to act truthfully or maliciously, which corresponds to colluding, in a speciﬁc moment of time.
Our objective is to allow the controller agent to schedule moments in time for maintenance
update. It is crucial to mention three factors that determine the constraints of our solution.
• The ﬁrst one is that the controller agent, which is an agent that takes the feedback ﬁle under
surveillance as deﬁned in [3], is not willing to investigate this ﬁle at every moment in time
because of limited resources and capacities. For example, during 100 minutes of activities
during which feedback submissions are performed at every second, the controller agent does
not have the capacity to perform the investigation and maintenance at every single minute.
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On the one hand, there are cases where communities might not have activities for a period of
time. On the other hand, in a busy environment, it is not wise to schedule very few periodic
maintenances since the chances of collusion are very high.
• The second factor is the type of community members. In open multi-agent systems, agents
diﬀer in there strategies in terms of when to perform the collusion as well as how damaging
the fake feedback is compared to the real reputation parameter. For example, we may have
agents that collude 2% of the time and others may be willing to collude for 90% of a time
interval. Even if we have two colluding agents with the same percentage, say 20%, one agent
may be willing to collude at moments 1 and 2 while the other at moments 8 and 9 in an
interval of 10 moments. Also, we may have agents that collude with service consumers, as
deﬁned in [3], which are agents that continuously seek for services provided by some other
agents, by populating very high feedback corresponding to dramatic change of behavior like
10/10 or a feedback that meets the average like 7/10, which is hard to detect. Community
members are also assumed to be rational in their behaviors [40]; they act towards maximizing
their own payoﬀs.
• The third one is that the controller agent needs to avoid choosing the same moment of check
during subsequent time intervals. The strategy the controller chooses should be hard to predict,
so it should not be an easy task to forgive malicious agents learn in advance the strategy of
the controller agent overtime. Otherwise, those malicious agents will have better opportunity
to schedule their collusion with maximum beneﬁt and causing tremendous damage to the
reputation of community.
To be focussed on the schedule problem, we assume that when the check is performed, the
controller has the capacity to detect malicious acts if performed by the checked member with full
accuracy. The game between the controller and community members can then be formalized as
follows, which corresponds to the phase of constructing the Bayesian Stackelberg game matrices R
and C in Figure 6:
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• Malicious act penalized: this is the case where the controller agent performs the mainte-
nance (the check) and penalizes the malicious agent by dismissing it from the community. The
controller agent gets a positive payoﬀ of +π as we assume that the users are rewarding the
controller for making the community secure. The community member gets a major penalty of
−(N +L)P , where N is the average number of possible requests the agent gets if not ﬁred, L
is the expected increase in the number of requests the agent can get if not penalized, and P
is the reward of that agent for serving each request. N + L is then the expected number of
requests the member can get if not ﬁred and −(N +L)P represents the loss undergone by the
member because of being ﬁred from the community.
• Malicious act ignored: this is the worst case of the controller agent in which a community
member is colluding but the controller did not prevent it by performing the maintenance check.
This corresponds to the controller payoﬀ of −π (as users will not pay the controller since the
system is not secure) and a reward of the community member of the value +(N + L)P (L
corresponds to the increase resulting from collusion to promote the member’s reputation).
• Good performance ignored: this is the case where the controller agent is not performing
maintenance and community member is not colluding, but performing well in terms of its
reputation increase. This corresponds to the payoﬀ of the controller of a value of +λ, which
is less than +π (as the community is secure and users are happy, but no update has been
made to justify a higher payoﬀ), and a payoﬀ of +(N + L)P for the member as the member
is beneﬁting from the increase L.
• Good performance recognized: this is the case where the controller agent is performing
maintenance and community member is not colluding, but performing well in terms of its
reputation increase. This corresponds to the payoﬀ of the controller of +π (as the community
is secure and updated and users are happy), and a payoﬀ of +(N + L)P for the member.
• Bad performance penalized: this is the case where the controller agent is penalizing the
member by dismissing it from the community not for collusion, but for bad performance. The
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controller payoﬀ is +π since an eﬀort has been done to make the community more reputable,
which increases the quality of service for the users. The corresponding payoﬀ of the member
is −NP because of being ﬁred, which means requests are lost.
• Bad performance ignored: this is the case where the controller agent is not doing the
maintenance and the member is not colluding, but doing bad in terms of reputation. The
controller payoﬀ is −π and the corresponding payoﬀ of the member is +NP .
We show in Table 3 the payoﬀ structure for our game theoretic framework at a given moment in
time with the column player as the controller agent and the row player as community member.
Perform maintenance Ignore maintenance
Collude (−(N + L)P , +π) (+(N + L)P , −π)
Not collude with good
performance
(+(N + L)P , +π) (+(N + L)P , +λ)
Not collude with bad
performance
(−NP , +π) (+NP , −π)
Table 3: Strategy proﬁles and payoﬀ structure of our game
In order to concretely present the game and makes it clear, we present the payoﬀ of a scenario in a
time interval of ﬁve moments. One possible scenario is that the controller is performing maintenance
update in moments 1 and 4 as shows in Table 4 and the community member under consideration is
assumed to be performing bad.
Collude Not collude with bad performance
Moment 1 (+π, −(N + L)P ) (+π, −NP )
Moment 2 (-π, +(N + L)P ) (-π, +NP )
Moment 3 (-π, +(N + L)P ) (-π, +NP )
Moment 4 (+π, −(N + L)P ) (+π, −NP )
Moment 5 (-π, +(N + L)P ) (-π, +NP )
Table 4: One possible scenario of payoﬀ structure between the controller agent and a community
member
The controller’s actions correspond to the row part of the table while the community member’s
actions correspond to the column part of the table. This model shows that it is straightforward for
this community member to avoid collusion at moments 1 and 4 and act maliciously in other moments
in order to maximize its payoﬀ. This would mean that we have a dramatic increase of fake feedback
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in this time interval, of up to 60% of the corresponding total feedback or reputation parameters.
3.4 Optimal Schedule
Our objective is scheduling the maintenance update, which means deciding about the moments
to perform the check in a time interval of M moments. As explained in the previous section, if
the scheduling algorithm provides predictable time line, then it increases the vulnerability of the
reputation mechanism and malicious web services in that community may beneﬁt from it. We inspire
by and extend the technique proposed in [8] that aims to decide which points to check in an airport.
However, our work is diﬀerent from [8] in two perspectives. The ﬁrst one is about the game model:
the structure of our game is diﬀerent from the one presented in [8] in both the payoﬀ structure
and actions available to the players, which makes the strategy proﬁles of the two games completely
diﬀerent. The second diﬀerence concerns the problem to be solved. In our work, a controller agent
will have to come up with a scheduling algorithm with respect to time; while in [8] the software
assistant has to come up with a solution for a resource allocation problem according to the available
checkpoints in site (i.e. the airport). We use DOBSS, Decomposed Optimized Bayesian Stackelberg
Game [8, 35,39] in our framework for the following reasons:
• It solves a Bayesian Stackelberg game given the leader’s payoﬀ, follower’s payoﬀ, and proba-
bility distribution of each follower type.
• It provides as output an optimal mixed strategy that takes into consideration the rationality
theory of the follower.
• It saves exponential time overhead by working on the compact version of the game rather than
applying complex transformation techniques [41]
In order to understand our controller’s algorithm, it is very important to explain the logic behind
optimal mixed strategy for a Bayesian Stackelberg game that was introduced in [8, 35, 39]. Let us
consider Table 5, adapted from [35], bearing in mind that the leader is the row player and follower





Table 5: Payoﬀ table for an example of a normal form game
only pure strategy is that the leader plays a and follower plays c. In fact, playing b for the leader
is strictly dominated since it ensures higher payoﬀ over the follower. Let us consider the following
scenario: given that the leader commits to a mixed strategy of playing a and b with equal probability
(0.5), the follower will choose to play d because 0.5 ∗ 1+ 0.5 ∗ 0 < 0.5 ∗ 0+ 0.5 ∗ 2. The payoﬀ of the
leader would be 0.5 ∗ 4 + 0.5 + 3 = 3.5.
Back to our problem, the question that arises is how to determine the probability distributions
over the vector of pure strategies of our controller, which consists of moments in a time interval. To
answer this question, let us start by considering a problem of one leader against one follower. First,
we present the mathematical reasoning with one community member type and then generalize the
solution to many types. Let us now introduce the problem parameters. During a given interval of
time, there is a given number of discrete moments where the controller has to play. In each moment,
the controller has two strategies: perform the check (strategy 1) or not (strategy 0). Similarly, there
is a given number of discrete moments where the member has to play by choosing between acting
truthfully (strategy 1) and acting maliciously (strategy 0). Let x and y be the pure strategy vectors
of the controller and community member respectively. xi is the strategy chosen by the controller at
moment i and yj is the strategy chosen by the member at moment j. Thus, xi ∈ {0, 1} where xi = 1
(resp. xi = 0) means strategy 1 (resp. 0) is played by the controller at moment i. yj ∈ {0, 1} has
the same meaning for the member. Let I be the index set of acting moments of the controller agent;
J be the index set of acting moments of the member; and R and C be the payoﬀ matrices such that
Rij is the controller agent’s reward and Cij is the member’s reward such that the controller agent
is playing strategy xi and the member is playing strategy yj . |I| and |J | are the cardinalities of
I and J respectively, where |J | is function of |I| and α represents the size of the time window to
be investigated relative to the log ﬁle where the feedback are recorded. In this thesis, we use the
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following linear function:
|J | = (α+ 1)|I| (5)
By ﬁxing the strategy vector of the controller (i.e ﬁxing x), the community member has to solve








s.t. yj ∈ {0, 1} j ∈ J (6)
The objective function is maximizing the member’s payoﬀ and the constraint makes feasible any
member’s mixed strategy. When solving this problem, it is obvious that for a given j, if
∑
i∈I Cij > 0
then yj = 1. Thus, we obtain:
∑
i∈I
Cij > 0 ⇒ yj = 1
∑
i∈I
Cij ≤ 0 ⇒ yj = 0






Cij) j ∈ J (7)
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Given a ﬁxed strategy vector y of the community member, The controller must choose its own
strategy x that is best response to y. Associated with the strategy of performing check (strategy 1)












xi > 0 (8)
xi ∈ {0, 1} i ∈ I
The objective function maximizes the controller’s payoﬀ by maximizing the reword Rij and
minimizing the cost ti, which is the proportion of the payoﬀ of our controller. The second constraint
forces the controller to have at least one check moment. From this problem, we obtain the general












xi ∈ {0, 1} i ∈ I (9)
yj ∈ {0, 1} j ∈ J
0 ≤ ti ≤ 1
The problem with the optimization problem (9) is that it does not consider the optimal solution
y of the member. This means, we need to add a constraint forcing the obtained solution for the
controller’s strategy vector x to be associated with the optimal solution for the member’s strategy




















Cij) j ∈ J (10)
yj ∈ {0, 1} j ∈ J
0 ≤ ti ≤ 1
The ﬁrst and second constraints enforce a feasible mixed strategy for the controller, and the third
and fourth constraints enforce a feasible mixed strategy for the community member.
3.5 Controller’s Scheduling Algorithm
We showed in the previous section how one leader can optimize its payoﬀ against one follower using
multiple integer quadratic programming. In order to solve the case of many follower types, we need
to consider the following additional parameters, which makes the game Bayesian:
• pl: the probability of encountering a member of type l;
• Rl and Cl: the payoﬀ matrices such that Rlij and Clij are the rewards associated with the
strategies xi and yj of the controller agent and community member of type l respectively;
• ylj : the pure strategy of the member of type l at moment j;
• L: the set of members types.
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Clij) j ∈ J (11)
ylj ∈ {0, 1} j ∈ J
0 ≤ ti ≤ 1
Notice that this optimization problem is a quadratic programming problem since we have two
unknown integers to solve xiy
l




























zlij ≤ |J | i ∈ I








Clij) j ∈ J
ylj ∈ {0, 1} j ∈ J
0 ≤ ti ≤ 1
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It is worth mentioning that the parameter pl (the probability of encountering a member of type
l) encapsulates the probability of receiving requests from that member. Because we are solving
multiple-integer linear programming (with multiple members), the overall requests distribution is
considered in the problem 12. Furthermore, the equivalence of the problems (11) and (12) is straight-
forward by construction as the objective function of (12) is a direct transformation of the objective
function of (11) and each constraint in (12) is directly obtained from a constraint in (11) using




ij . The objective function maximizes the payoﬀ of the controller
agent against diﬀerent community members having diﬀerent types. The output of this program is
the mixed strategy for the controller, which dictates the strategy to choose at each moment (i.e.
performing the check or not) given that the community members are playing the best strategies
(i.e. best responses). Thus, the controller’s strategy vector we obtain is the optimal schedule we are
seeking, which corresponds to stage four in the controller’s ﬂow chart (Figure 6) explained earlier.
To show how the dynamism is captured in this optimization problem, let us consider the following
example with |I| = |J | = 5 (i.e. acting over 5 moments). Assuming that the solution the algorithm
provides for x is (1; 0; 0; 1; 1); this means the controller should perform the check at moments t1;
t4, and t5. This will correspond to the best strategies of the member. Consequently, most likely
the member will play honest all the time or collude during times where the check is performed (as
the controller is playing assuming that the member is maximizing its payoﬀ). In fact, the following
theorem holds:
Theorem 3.5.1 The optimal solution given by solving the problem 12 is Pareto optimal.
Proof: Solving problem 12 results in an optimal solution for the controller in terms of payoﬀ given
that the community member is maximizing its payoﬀ. Consequently, any change in the controllers
strategy will not make this controller better oﬀ without making the member worse oﬀ (the controller
can gain more by detecting a collusion only if the member gains less by being detected as malicious).
Conversely, any change in the member strategy can make this member better oﬀ (malicious action
not detected) only if it makes the controller worse oﬀ. Thus, there is no Pareto improvement that
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This chapter presents the settings of our simulations in terms of implementation context and tech-
nological details. We show our results in both static and dynamic environments concerning reducing
the number of fake feedback. We conclude this chapter with a qualitative analysis of our algorithm
in terms of variance of output and controller’s overall payoﬀ.
4.1 Simulation Settings
Our simulation consists of interactions between users and web services. According to a certain
schedule, the controller agent performs a maintenance update. Every agent is being checked for
its performance and this agent is being penalized by leaving the community in case the average
reputation calculated is less than an average reputation deﬁned by the controller agent. Therefore,
the web service is being penalized for performance reasons only.
At every moment, certain agents may collude once at most. The number of requests received
by each web service is directly proportional to the maintenance results. Thus, each none penalized
web service is being rewarded with an increase in terms of requests that can be received during that
time interval.
At the beginning of every round, the controller agent follows an algorithm to decide when to
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perform the update in that round, taking into consideration the strategies of collusion of the web
services for that round. Possible collusion can be deﬁned as the fake feedback provided by the user
towards the web service that does not demonstrate its true performance, which can be made at every
moment.
For example, consider web services A, B, and C as part of one community that conditions for
each web service to perform on average 7 out of 10 with a variance of 0.2. In other words, agents are
allowed to stay in the community if their reputation average falls between 6.8 and 7.2 inclusively.
At the start of the simulation, they can receive up to 10 requests during a time interval of ten
moments. At moment 3, our controller performs its maintenance phase during which agent A’s
reputation average is 6.9, agent B’s reputation average is 7.15, and agent C’s reputation average is
6.5. According to our rule, agent C gets major penalty by leaving the community; which means it
will not get any more income for services. Logically speaking, agent A’s reputation value is closer
to 7 than agent B’s reputation value. Therefore, our controller will devote more requests to agent A
than agent B, say 11 requests to agent A and 9 requests to agent B for the following interval starting
from the moment 3.
The simulation of the controller behavior is implemented in ﬁve forms. The ﬁrst form is the ﬁxed
time check: the controller agent chooses ﬁxed moments in time at every round and it gets repeated
for many rounds. The second form is a uniform random time check: the controller agent chooses
moments in time using a uniform random distribution at the beginning of every round. The third
form is a normal random time check: the controller agent chooses moments in time using a normal
random distribution at the beginning of every round. The fourth form is a poisson random time
check: the controller agent chooses moments in time using a poisson random distribution at the
beginning of every round. The ﬁfth form is using a mixed strategy that is based on a game theoretic
implementation consisting of a Bayesian Stackelberg game: the controller agent chooses moments in
time based on the solution provided by the DOBSS.
Concerning the technologies, we list their uses in our two simulation settings that will be discussed
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in the next section. We implemented our simulator in Java 6 as compiler and interpreter using
Netbeans 6.9.1. The simulation results (data) supply a relational database under MySQL 5.5. At
the end of each run, statistical data are registered in the database and is being imported to an Excel
ﬁle for analysis. As for the four scheduling algorithms, we have proceeded as follows:
• Uniform random scheduling: we have used the nextInt() function from java.util.Random
library in order to allow our controller agent to select uniform moments in time.
• Normal random scheduling: we have used the nextGaussian() function from java.util.Random
library in order to allow our controller agent to select moments in time following the Gaussian
distribution.
• Poisson random scheduling: we have used the com.softnetConsult.utils.random.Poisson
and the average feedback for a given time line as the parameter λ in order to allow our
controller agent to select moments following a Poisson distribution in time.
• DOBSS scheduling: we have used the external library LPSolver 5.1 that takes as input the
game theory model we implemented and gives as output moments in time for the controller
to perform the check.
The runs were performed on a Windows machine with Intel Core2 CPU, 1.86GHz for each
processor and 5GB of RAM. In summary, our java project consists of the following classes:
• Agent: this abstract class is our superclass with Id and name as attributes.
• ControllerAgent: this abstract class is a subclass of the agent that demonstrates our controller
agent with attributes such as mixedStrategy for saving next schedule, average for the average
performance, and threshold for the precision degree of the average.
• BayesianStackelbergControllerAgent: this subclass of ControllerAgent performs its scheduling
based on the Bayesian Stackelberg game with attributes such as Rl for payoﬀ for our controller,
Cl for payoﬀ for provider agents regardless of their types, and p as probability distribution of
the types of these agents.
• FixedControllerAgent: this subclass of ControllerAgent performs its scheduling based on a
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ﬁxed, pre-determined schedule for every time interval.
• RandomControllerAgent: this abstract class is also a subclass of ControllerAgent. It is meant
to provide software reuse features among the three random controller classes that are deﬁned
next.
• UniformRandomControllerAgent: this subclass of RandomControllerAgent performs its schedul-
ing algorithm based on random generation of variables using java.util.Random as explained
previously.
• PoissonControllerAgent: this subclass of RandomControllerAgent performs its scheduling al-
gorithm based on the Poisson random generation of variables.
• NormalRandomControllerAgent: this subclass of RandomControllerAgent performs its schedul-
ing algorithm based on nextGaussian() generator of Gaussian variables.
• WebService: this subclass of Agent simulates our provider agent. Among its parameters are
balance, collusion degree, response time as the time the agent takes to reply to a certain request,
waiting queue for diﬀerent user agents, when to collude for scheduling collusion scenarios with
selected user agents, and charging price.
• User: this subclass of Agent is our consumer agent with properties of balance, preferred time
response, which is compared against the actual waiting time to rate the agent’s satisfaction,
and collusion price that corresponds to the price service provider needs to pay in order for this
user agent to provide fake feedback to alter the reputation mechanism.
• ReputationValue: this class encapsulates our reputation parameter with parameters of web
service id, user id, reputation, and time at which this satisfaction has been registered into a
log ﬁle, which is called feedback ﬁle.
• FeedbackFile: this class represents our history ﬁle for every single web service in the commu-





Our static simulation is characterized by the following data:
• Number of users = 100.
• Number of web services = 50.
• Number of runs = 10.
The distribution of colluding web services in the experiment is presented in Table 6. Our results
consist of analyzing over 10 diﬀerent runs on each strategy the percentage of fake feedback in the
community. Figure 7 shows collusion percentage at each moment in time across the ﬁve scheduling
algorithms. Two conclusions can be drawn from this ﬁgure. The ﬁrst one is that the DOBSS
algorithm manages to reduce the number of collusion earlier than the other algorithm for less than
5%. As the vertical lines on each graph of the ﬁgure shows, precisely at moment 40 DOBSS manages
to reduce the number of collusion to 5 percent where the other algorithms reach the same result at
moments no earlier than 45. The second remark is that the DOBSS manages to have the smallest
number of collusion at the last moment compared to the other algorithms. Table 7 exhibits this
fact, where the percentage has been rounded to two decimal numbers.






Table 6: Distribution of the collusion degree in our static simulation
DOBSS Fixed time Normal random Poisson random Uniform random
Moment 95 1.51 2.47 2.01 2.02 2.31
Moment 96 1.22 2.61 2.44 2.74 2.27
Moment 97 1.77 2.32 2.59 2.83 1.92
Moment 98 1.80 2.59 2.30 2.97 1.95
Moment 99 1.52 2.44 2.50 2.64 2.03
Table 7: Percentage of the collusion degree at the last ﬁve moments
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Figure 7: Comparative results between the scheduling algorithms in a static environment
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In the next simulation, we analyzed the behavior of the ﬁve diﬀerent algorithms in a dynamic
environment, an environment where web services and agents join and leave the community dynam-
ically. This simulation allows investigating two metrics: the ﬁrst one is how can controller agents
under diﬀerent time check algorithms be able to cope with the environment change; the second one is
how fast the controller agent can react according to a change of environment. Over 10 diﬀerent runs
on each strategy, the obtained results regarding the percentage of fake feedback in the community
and the percentage of collusion at each moment in time across the ﬁve scheduling algorithms are
shown in Figure 8.
Before pointing out the results from our dynamic simulation, it is very important to explain
the sudden drop in the very ﬁrst moments across the ﬁve algorithms. At the starting point of the
simulation, web services receive the same number of requests. Once the maintenance is performed,
our controller agent, regardless of the scheduling algorithm, rewards the ranked web services with
an increase in terms of requests per interval. Therefore, since the malicious web services performed
collusion to mislead the controller agent before the maintenance, they get more requests after the
maintenance has been performed. Hence, the number of truthful feedback increases after the main-
tenance phase while the number of fake feedback are nearly the same.
As depicted in Figure 8, the DOBSS algorithm is more stable in terms of reducing the collusion
percentage regardless of the dynamic environment. It also manages to get the minimum number of
collusion, especially at the last moments starting from the moment 89 till the end of the simulation.
It also shows that the controller agent under DOBSS algorithm was able to react quicker than the
rest of the algorithms concerning penalizing the malicious web services before they have the chance
to collude.
4.2.2 Controller’s Overall Reward
To better show the results and merits of our scheduling algorithm, we conducted additional simula-
tions under new simulation settings. The changes of the settings were applied on both the number
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Figure 8: Comparative results between the scheduling algorithms in a dynamic environment
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of users and number of web services. In addition, we modiﬁed the distribution of colluding web
services in order to have a diﬀerent view of the performance of our algorithm. We have set this
simulation with the following data in a static environment, where a controller agent is dealing with
the same agents across time:
• Number of users = 250.
• Number of web services = 75.
• Number of runs = 10.
The distribution of colluding web services in the static simulation is presented in Table 8.






Table 8: Distribution of the collusion degree in controller’s overall reward in a static environment
Our results of analyzing the controller’s reward output in the ﬁve scheduling algorithms are
demonstrated in Figure 9. It is shown that most of the time, using DOBSS strategy, the controller
insures higher reward. The fact that our solution is based on maximizing payoﬀs explains the results.
In order to determine which strategy works better under general settings, we extended the
simulation under dynamic settings. The results of this simulation in terms of obtained reward are
shown in Figure 10. As theoretically expected, we notice that under the DOBSS solving strategy, our
controller gets more payoﬀ than in other strategies. Moreover, the controller was able to maximize
its beneﬁts even under dynamic settings. Compared to other scheduling strategies, only after short
time (moment 25) that our controller agent using the proposed scheduling algorithm start to increase
its payoﬀ.
4.2.3 Predictability Analysis
Predictability analysis, also called here randomization, of the scheduling pattern aims at addressing
the issue of being or not easily predictable. Our ultimate objective is to see over long period of
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Figure 9: Comparative results in terms of controller reward in static settings
Figure 10: Comparative results in terms of controller reward in dynamic settings
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time, while the controller is trying to maximize its proﬁt, if the scheduled check moments can be
guessed given previous check moments. In fact, being easily predictable will unintentionally allow
malicious intelligent agents to beneﬁt from this vulnerability. To this end, we conducted simulations
and analysis over the output generated by the diﬀerent scheduling algorithms as mixed strategies
in the same settings as the previous experiment (Table 8). For static environment, our results are
reported in Figure 11 and in Figure 12 for dynamic environment. We notice that at the same time
that our controller maximized its output as seen in Figure 9, it was able to generate schedules (i.e.
check moments) that are of signiﬁcant variance than any other scheduling algorithm, even higher
than stochastic randomization techniques. Having high variance is a strong indicator that the check
moments are not following a well shaped pattern, which makes their predictability hard. In dynamic
environment, our scheduling algorithm have higher variance than in static environment. This is
mainly due to the fact that situation changes frequently through time intervals and our solver was
able to adapt itself in terms of scheduling output. Our main conclusion is that it is harder to predict
check moments under our scheduling algorithm than under regular randomization techniques.
Figure 11: Comparative results in terms of scheduling output variance in static settings
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Figure 12: Comparative results in terms of scheduling output variance in dynamic settings
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Work
5.1 Contributions
The main contribution of this thesis is the proposition of a scheduling algorithm to decide about
moments where the trust maintenance can be performed by the controller agent within a community
of rational and selﬁsh agents. We used a game theoretic model where diﬀerent strategy proﬁles
for the participating agents are considered. We theoretically presented the game and deﬁned the
associated payoﬀ structure. One important fact to notice is that whatever reputation mechanism the
controller agent applies, agents in the community will very likely have the chance to closely observe
the behavior of the controller agent in terms of scheduling the maintenance (or check) update. To
consider this fact, we proposed to use our Stackelberg game that the controller agent plays as a
leader and the remaining agents in the community as followers. As we have demonstrated in this
thesis, agents do diﬀer in their strategies in terms of collusion; hence, our controller agent is facing
multiple types which makes the game Bayesian. This makes the scheduling mechanism a Bayesian
Stackelberg game, which is solved using optimization techniques. We also demonstrated the eﬃciency
of the proposed algorithm in terms of reducing fake feedback in the log ﬁle against other scheduling
algorithms. This algorithm allows our controller agent to maintain a sound reputation mechanism
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in its community of agents.
5.2 Limitations and Future Work
This research demonstrated the potential of using game theoretic foundations in order to eﬀectively
and eﬃciently schedule maintenance update to allow the controller agent to force other agents to
act truthfully. However, still further research is needed and interesting research questions are to be
explored. Among which are:
• Include, in the game theoretic model, the possibility of optimizing the review window on each
agent. In other words, investigating the question of how can we determine the portion of
feedback that our controller agent needs to analyze since the last maintenance operation.
• Include the possibility of initiating malicious feedback from the user agent in our game scenario
since we assumed that collusion is initiated from provider agents. This means that our game
will be extended from two players to three players operations with diﬀerent payoﬀ structure.
• The third one is to consider diﬀerent probabilities of the controller’s accuracy, which implies
using more parameters and introducing sophisticated solving techniques.
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